Could be worse. Will be, if ignored.
The canary has seen this film before.
| Check | Status | Finding |
|---|---|---|
| DNS resolves | Pass | Public address: 104.20.23.154, 172.66.147.243, 2606:4700:10::ac42:93f3 |
| Mail routing (MX) | Pass | Null MX published — this domain deliberately accepts no email (RFC 7505). |
| SPF | Pass | SPF present, using about 0 of 10 allowed DNS lookups. |
| DKIM | Warn | No DKIM key found for common selectors (default, google, s1, s2, mail). Mail may be unsigned, or uses another selector. |
| DMARC | Pass | DMARC policy is p=reject — spoofed mail is actively handled. |
| SSL certificate (443) | Pass | Certificate for example.com from SSL Corporation, expires in 67 day(s). |
| HTTP security headers | Warn | Answering over HTTPS; missing header(s): HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP. |
DKIM: DKIM cryptographically signs outgoing mail so receivers can prove it was not altered in transit. Major providers increasingly require it.
Fix: Generate the key in your mail provider's admin console, publish the TXT record it gives you at <selector>._domainkey, then enable signing. The selector field above lets you check a non-standard selector.
HTTP security headers: HSTS forces HTTPS, X-Content-Type-Options stops MIME-sniffing attacks, X-Frame-Options and CSP mitigate clickjacking and cross-site scripting.
Fix: Add them at your web server or CDN. Typical values: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN, plus a Content-Security-Policy tailored to the site.
Copy buttons copy only the plain record — the grumpy verdict stays on the page.
Share this report: https://ipeeve.com/health/example.com (cached 15 minutes)
